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1. Introduction
In two influential papers Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993]
showed how introducing random innovations (mutations) into a model of evolutionary
adjustment enables predictions about which of several strict Nash equilibria will occur in
the very long run. Key to this result is the possibility that strategies that perform poorly
may be introduced into the population in sufficient numbers through innovation that they
begin to perform well. Here we examine imitation as an alternative propagation
mechanism. A striking fact is that if imitation is much more likely than innovation, it is
significantly easier to find the long-run equilibrium. First, the long-run limit contains
only pure strategies. Second, calculations can be made by comparing pairs of pure
strategies to see how well they do against one another. One useful result is that it is
sufficient that a strategy profile beat all others in pairwise contests. As we illustrate
through examples, this is implied by, but more likely to be satisfied than, the criterion of
½-dominance proposed by Morris, Rob and Shin [1993].
This work stems from our admiration of the existing theory, a desire to apply it to
interesting games, and our dissatisfaction with innovation as a propagation mechanism.
To us, the theory of evolution with persistent randomness is a theory of the propagation
of ideas through a population. Key to analyzing long-run dynamics is the possibility that
bad ideas may spread, changing which ideas are good and which are bad. To think of this
propagation taking place through random innovations seems highly unsatisfactory. It is
hard to think of any significant changes in institutions that have occurred in human
history because large numbers of people simply happen to have tried the same thing at
more or less the same time. Rather, we believe that ideas are spread through imitation.
One example is the change of institutions through civil disobedience, as occurred, for
example, in East Germany. Initially a small number of people protested the existing
government. It seems likely that rational calculation would show that this was a bad idea
– that the probability of being punished severely was substantial. But others imitated, and
once the idea spread sufficiently widely, the probability of punishment dropped, and civil
disobedience became a best response.
In addition to the work mentioned above, there are several other papers that have
a connection to our results. Bergin and Lipman [1994] show that the relative probabilities2
of different types of noise can make an enormous difference in long-run equilibrium; here
we explore on particular theory of how those relative probabilities are determined. Van
Damme and Weibull [1998] study a model in which it is costly to reduce errors, and
show that the basic 2x2 results on risk dominance go through. By way of contrast, our
focus is on larger more complex games. Our result about winning pairwise contests is
connected to a result of Kandori and Rob [1993]. We explain this connection in
conjunction with introducing our own result about winning pairwise contests.
2. The Model
We study a symmetric normal form game with a single population of players.
There is a finite number 3  of pure strategies, and we write S3   for a typical pure
strategy. Notice that we use the same symbol for the number of pure strategies and the set
of pure strategies. Mixed strategies are vectors of probabilities denoted by  T 4. A
mixed strategy is called pure if it puts unit weight on a single pure strategy; we denote
the mixed strategy corresponding to the pure strategy S  also by S . The utility of a player
depends on his own pure strategy and the mixed strategy played by the population. It is
written   	 UST .  We assume that U  is continuous in  T . A prototypical example is a
game in which players from different populations are randomly matched to play
particular player roles; we discuss this along with other examples below.
There are M  players in the population, each of whom plays a pure strategy. At
time T  we denote the distribution of strategies in the population by  T T 4. Initially at
time   T   there is a given initial condition  ￿ T . In subsequent periods  T T  is determined
from  ￿ T T ￿  according to the following “imitative” process.
1)  One player I  is chosen at random. Only this player changes his strategy.
2)  With probability #F  player I  chooses from 3  randomly using the probabilities
￿ T T ￿ . This is called imitation: strategies are chosen in proportion to how frequently
they were played in the population in the previous period.
3)  With probability  N F  player I  chooses from 3  randomly with equal probabilities of
3  of choosing each strategy. This is called innovation: strategies are picked
regardless of how widely used they are, or how successful they are.
4)  With probability  N #FF  player  I  chooses randomly with equal probabilities
among the set of strategies that solve the problem used by the most players3
￿ ￿ \￿ ￿ ￿ MAX   	
T T SS US T T
￿ ￿ ￿ %% % .
This is called a relative best response: it is the best response among those strategies that
are actually used by the particular population.
Observe that this process gives rise to a Markov process  -  on the state space
M 4 4  consisting of all mixed strategies consistent with the grid induced by each
player playing a pure strategy. Note that all pure strategies are in  M 4 . The process -  is
positively recurrent, and so has a unique invariant distribution  F N . Our goal is to
characterize  ￿ LIM F
F NN l w .
Our main assumption is that imitation is much more likely than innovation.
Specifically
Unlikely Innovation: NM  .
In particular this means that as   F l  it is far more likely that every player in the
population will change strategy by imitation than even a single player will innovate.
By way of contrast standard evolutionary models of persistent randomness assume
Standard Model:   #  .
Actually the standard model does not use relative best response for players who are not
innovating (often called mutating), but typically some variation on the best response
dynamic. As we shall see below, this does not make that much difference.
 Discussion and Examples
We should first indicate the strong connection between the case of unlikely
imitation   #  , and the standard case of innovation (or mutation) and a best-response
like dynamic. In matching games, generally speaking, the basins of steady states are
determined by fractions of the population. Consequently as the population size goes to
infinity, the difference in the number of innovations needed to move from one steady
state to another, versus the number required to move back, typically goes to infinity. It is
this difference that determines which are the stochastically steady states. On the other
hand, while the relative best-response dynamic is different than the best-response
dynamic, it requires only a number of innovations equal to the total number of strategies
in the game to make sure that every strategy is actually in use. In this interior case, the
best-response and relative best-response dynamics are identical. Since this is a fixed4
number of innovations, when the population size is large enough, it is swamped by the
difference in innovations required to move between steady states, and the calculations
made for stochastic stability in the best-response case coincide with those in the relative
best-response case. As a result, except in knife-edge cases, we do not expect unlikely
imitation to yield different results than Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993], or Young
[1993], or subsequent research using the standard model.
We should also note that the assumption of a single-population is significant. In
the existing literature, this has been the primary focus of research, although Hahn [1995]
does have some results in the multiple population case. Here the single-population
assumption not only means that all players are a priori identical, but that there is only one
population within which ideas spread.  The case in which ideas are more likely to spread
within particular exogenously or endogenously identified populations of “people like me”
is of great interest. The model of Friedman [1998] in which players are sometimes
matched with opponents from the same population and sometimes with opponents from a
different population provides a natural setting for this type of study, but it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
A prototypical example of the type of environment we are studying is a matching
game. A matching game is defined by a utility function  ￿￿    	 J* UAA A % K  where
   J*  K  are player roles, and  J A!  , a finite set, is called an action. Players are
randomly assigned to different roles. Strategies are maps from roles to actions
[     ] S* ! l K . The function   	 UST  is computed by calculating the probability of
playing different roles, and meeting opponents playing different roles.
￿￿
￿\   	  	  	 	   		  	 *J
* J* K
KJ JS 3 S S US * U S S S * S TT
v ￿￿ ￿    %%%% % % % K
We make the fairly standard, and in a large population relatively innocuous,
simplification that a player does not take into account the fact that he cannot meet
himself. Notice that only in the case of two player games is   	 UST  linear in  T , which is
the most familiar case. Also of interest are anonymous matching games which are
matching games in which strategies are restricted to be independent of the player role, so
that 3!  .5
3. Basic Results
We begin by establishing some basic results. First, we examine the relative best-
response dynamic in the unperturbed case   F  . This dynamic is similar in some
respects to the replicator: for example, all pure profiles are steady states, but points that
are not Nash equilibria are not locally stable. Second, we establish two basic results for
the perturbed case   F  . When imitation is much more likely than innovation, mixed
strategies should be less stable than pure strategies. A mixed strategy can evolve into a
pure strategy purely through imitation, while a pure strategy cannot evolve at all without
at least one innovation. We confirm this intuition by showing that the limit invariant
distribution N  places weight only on pure profiles in 
M 4 . We then further study the
connection between the limit invariant distribution  N  and Nash equilibrium, showing
that if the support of  N  is a singleton, it must be a Nash equilibrium.
Let  ￿ N  be an irreducible invariant distribution of the Markov process in which
 F  . Let  X  be the set of mixed strategies in the state space  M 4  that this invariant
distribution gives positive weight to. We call such an  X  an ergodic set. Let 8  be the set
of all such  X .   Note that this is a set of sets. Let  	 3 T  denote the set of pure strategies
used with positive probability in T . First we establish some basic facts about  8 .
Lemma 3.1: The sets  X  are disjoint. Each set consisting of a singleton pure profile
[] S 8. If   TT X  8  then  	  	 33 TT  .
Proof:  When   F   we have the relative best-response dynamic in which in each player
one player switches with equal probability to one of the relative best-responses to the
current state. The sets  X  are by definition minimal invariant sets under the relative best-
response dynamic. That these sets are disjoint is immediate from the definition. Pure
profiles are absorbing since no strategy can be used unless it is already in use. This means
that every set  X  consisting of a single pure strategy is in  8 . To see that have
	  	 33 TT  , observe that the relative best-response dynamic cannot ever increase the
set of strategies in use. If there is a point  	   	 S3 S3 TT   then the probability that
the best-response dynamic goes from  T  to   T  is zero, which is inconsistent with the two
strategies lying in the same ergodic set.
æ6
The third part of the Lemma means that for each  X 8 we may assign a unique
set of pure strategies  	 3 X  corresponding to  	  3 TT X  .
The relative best-response dynamic is similar to the better-known replicator
dynamic in several respects. Like the replicator dynamic, the relative best-response
dynamic is absorbed by pure strategies and so has many steady states. However, as is the
case with the replicator, this is offset somewhat by the fact that points that do not
correspond to Nash equilibria are locally unstable. By locally unstable, we mean that
there is a neighborhood of the state and a change in strategy by a single player that leads
to a positive probability of exiting that neighborhood.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose  T  is such that for some S % with  	  S T  %  we have
 	  	 US US TT  % . Then for all sufficiently large N , if  TX   it is locally unstable.
Proof: Since U  is continuous, there is a neighborhood of  T  in which   	  	 US US TT  % .
Also, since  	  S T  %  we may assume that this is also the case in this neighborhood. For
N  sufficiently large the neighborhood must contain points in which one player is playing
S . At each such point, the relative best-response assigns positive probability to the
number of players playing S % decreasing by one, so there is positive probability of exiting
the neighborhood.
æ
Turning to the case   F  , from a theorem of Young [1993]  N  may be described
as a probability distribution over 8 . Our intuition that pure strategies are more important
in a setting of innovation is confirmed by our first theorem.
Theorem 3.3: With unlikely innovation the limit invariant distribution  N  puts weight
only on the sets  X 8 that consist of a single pure strategy .
3
To prove this theorem, and our additional results, we will use the characterization
of N  given by Young [1993].
4 Let  U  be a tree whose nodes are the set  8 . We denote by
	 UX  the unique predecessor of  X . An  X -tree is a tree whose root is  X . For any two
points   XX8 %  we define the resistance  	 R XX %  as follows. First, a path from  X  to  X %
                                                
3 A similar result has been shown for imitation in the form of genetic algorithms. See Dawid [1999]
Theorem 4.2.1, for example.
4 Although the standard convention in game theory is that a tree begins at the root, Young [1993] followed
the mathematical convention that it ends there. We have used the usual game-theoretic convention, so our
trees go the opposite direction of Young’s.7
is a sequence of points  ￿  	 M
+ TT 4 K with  ￿ TX  ,  + TX  %  and  ￿ K T ￿  reachable
from  K T  by a single player changing strategy. If the change from  K T  to  ￿ K T ￿  is a
relative best-response, the resistance of  K T  is 0; if the change is an imitation the
resistance is 1; if the change is an innovation the resistance is M . The resistance of a
path is the sum of the resistance of each point in the sequence. The resistance  	 R XX %  is
the least resistance of any path from  X  to  X % . The resistance  	 R U  of the  X -tree  U  is
the sum over non-root nodes of  	 	 R XUX %% . The resistance of  X ,  	 R X  is the least
resistance of any  X -tree. The following Theorem is proven in Young [1993].
Young’s Theorem:  	  NX   if and only if
	 M I N 	 RR X XX ￿8  % %
Remark: The set of  X  for which  	  NX   is called the stochastically stable set.
The basic tool for analyzing  N  is tree surgery, by which we transform one tree
into another and compare the resistances of the two trees. Suppose that  U  is an  X -tree.
For any nodes  XX v %  we cut the  X % -subtree separating the original tree into two trees;
one the  X % -subtree and the other what is left over. This reduces the resistance by
	 	 R XUX %% . If  X )  is a node in either of the two trees, and  e X  is the root of the other tree,
we may paste  e X  to  X )  by defining  e	 UX X  ) . This tree has the root of the tree
containing X ) . The paste operation increases the resistance by  e 	 R XX ) , so the new tree
has resistance  	  e  	 	 	 RR R UX XX U X  ) %% . These operations can be used to characterize
classes of least resistance trees, by showing certain operation do not increase the
resistance. They can also be used as below in proof by contradiction, showing that certain
trees cannot be least resistance because it is possible to cut and paste in such a way that
the resistance is reduced.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Suppose that  	  NX   and that  X  is not a singleton pure profile.
Let  U  be a least resistance  X -tree. Let  S X  %  be a singleton pure strategy that is played
with positive probability by some  TX  , that is,  	 S3 X  . Cutting  X %  and pasting the
root  X to it. Since  X %  is a singleton pure profile, it requires at least one innovation to go
anywhere, so cutting reduces the resistance by at least N . On the other hand, since
TX   and  	  TX  % , we can go from  X  to  X %  by no more than M  imitations, pasting
the root to  X %  increases the resistance by at most M . By the assumption of unlikely8
innovation, this implies that the new tree has strictly less resistance than the old
contradicting Young’s Theorem.
æ
4. Winning Pairwise Contests is Sufficient
We now establish our first main result: we show that if a pure strategy beats all
others in pairwise contests, then it is the unique stochastically stable state. We begin by
explaining what it means to win pairwise contests.
Definition 4.1: Suppose that   SS 3  % . For   X bb define a family of mixed
strategies  	 X T  by  	 ;= 	 ;=  XS X XS X TT   % .  If for all  X p
   		    		  US X US X TT  %
we say that S  beats S %.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose unlikely innovation, sufficiently large N  and that S beats all
SS v % . Then  [ ]	  S N  .
Proof: Suppose that there is other some  X  with  	  NX  . By Theorem 3.2  e [] S X 
for some pure strategy  e S . Let  U  be the least resistance  X -tree. Since it is not the root,
we may suppose that [] S  is attached to some  X % , and consider cutting it and pasting the
root to it. It took at least one innovation plus, since S  beats any point in  X % , more than
 M  imitations to get to  X % , so the resistance is reduced by strictly more than
 NM  . However, since S  beats  e S  we can get from  e [] S X   to [] S  with one
innovation and no more than   M  imitations.  So resistance is strictly reduced
contradicting Young’s Theorem.
æ
The hypothesis, that when half or more of the population is playing S  against any
other pure profile, all players prefer to play S  is connected to the idea of ½-dominance
introduced by Morris, Rob and Shin [1993]. The concept of ½-dominance is that when
half or more of the population is playing S  against any other combination of strategies, it
is a best response to play S . The concept here is weaker in two respects: first, S  must
only beat pure profiles, not arbitrary combinations of strategies. Second, S  must win
only in the sense of being a relative best-response, it need not actually be a best-response;9
a third strategy may actually do better than S , and this is significant as we will see in
examples below. On the other hand, ½-dominance clearly implies winning all pairwise
contests, so if there is a ½-dominant strategy, from Morris, Rob and Shin [1993] it is
stochastically stable with respect to the usual evolutionary dynamic, and it is also
stochastically stable when innovation is unlikely. Examples below will show clearly how
the usual notion of stochastic stability and the case of unlikely innovation diverge when
½-dominance fails, as well illustrating that in interesting games there can be a strategy
that wins all pairwise contests, even though there is no ½-dominant strategy.
Interestingly, Kandori and Rob [1993] study a class of games in which winning
all pairwise contests implies ½-dominance. They study single population matching games
satisfying the “total bandwagon property” meaning that the best response to any mixed
strategy is contained in the support of that mixed strategy. In particular, this means that
any pure profile is a Nash equilibrium. They make several other assumptions as well, but
as Fudenberg and Levine [1998] point out, these other assumptions are redundant. In a
game satisfying the “total bandwagon property” if S  wins all pairwise contests, it must
be actually be a best-response against every other pure strategy when ½ the population is
playing  S . Since utility is linear in the population distribution of strategies, this means
that  S  is actually best response against any combination of strategies when ½ the
population is playing S , so in fact S  is in fact ½-dominant.
Example 4.1: A Specialization Game
We now study a simple game with a unique equilibrium that is mixed. This
illustrates that unlikely innovation can be quite different than unlikely imitation. Consider
a simple  q symmetric game of specialization: players may specialize in being hunters
or gatherers. If both choose the same specialization they consume only one product,
resulting in a utility of zero.  If they choose different specializations they trade, consume




We first assume that this is played as an anonymous matching game. This means the only
pure strategies are Hunt and Gather. From symmetry it is obvious both must have equal
weight (of ½) in the limit distribution with unlikely innovation. This is very different than
the case the standard case: the mixed equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium and it is
the unique point in 8  since players prefer to do the opposite of what everyone else is
doing. This means that it takes one innovation to get to the basin of the mixed
equilibrium, while it takes half the population to innovate to get out of the basin. Notice
that even with unlikely imitation, we continue to assume the relative best-response
dynamic, but this makes little difference as it takes only a single innovation to get out of
the non-Nash points in 8 .
We should digress briefly to discuss how mixed strategy Nash equilibria appear in
8 . If the mixed strategy is actually on the grid, then it will be in  X , but this is unlikely.
If the mixed strategy is not on the grid, there are two possibilities depending on whether
it is stable in the relative best-response dynamic or not. If it is not, then there will not be
any point in  8  corresponding the mixed equilibrium. If it is stable, then there will be a
small cycle around the mixed equilibrium that will be in 8 – it is this we refer to as the
mixed strategy, although strictly speaking it is not.
The hunter-gatherer example reflects an aspect of unlikely innovation that should
be disturbing. There can be no stochastically stable mixed equilibria. In this example the
only Nash equilibrium is mixed, and the result is that the stochastically stable set is not
Nash and gives players less than the minmax as well. However, implicit in this
formulation is that mixing takes places by accident, through half of the population doing
one thing and half something else. It is fairly well known in the learning literature, for
example from Fudenberg and Kreps [1993], that this can be problematic. However, we
can also consider mixing through explicit randomization: that is, introduce a mixed
strategy as an explicit pure strategy. Suppose that we do this in the example: we add a
strategy of randomizing 50-50 between Hunt and Gather. It is apparent that if half the
population is following this strategy and half is playing a pure strategy (Hunt, for
example) it is better to mix. So the new mixing strategy wins all pairwise contests and is
the unique stochastically stable state.
Once we admit the possibility of explicit mixing, however, there is an even better
idea than can make its way into the population: using a correlating, or identifying device.11
That is, an anonymous game restricts players to actions that are independent of their
player roles (which might correspond, for example, to man and woman). The fact is that
while in the laboratory it is possible to create anonymous matching games, it is not
terribly likely to happen in the field. If the game is played as a non-anonymous matching
game, then there are two additional strategies of Hunt when player 1 and Gather when
player 2, and vice versa. Either of these strategies is Pareto efficient, and seem to reflect
historical patterns of specialization (men hunt, women gather).
Because neither of the two new strategies beats the other, it is useful to consider
an extension of the main theorem that gives a sufficient condition for a set of pure
strategies to be the only ones receiving positive weight in the limit distribution.
Definition 4.2: A set of pure strategies  e 3  beats the field if each strategy  e S3  beats
all  e S3  % .
The next theorem is specialization of Corollary C.2 in Appendix C.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose unlikely innovation, sufficiently large M  and that  e 3  beats the
field.  Then  e [ ]	 
S3 S N
￿   .
Proof:  See Appendix C, Lemma C.2  (i).
æ
Turning back to the example, we see that Hunt/Gather and Gather/Hunt are the
stochastically stable set; it is clear from symmetry that they are equally likely.
Comparison to the standard case is simplified if we break part of the symmetry by





This does not change the analysis in the case of unlikely innovation. However, in the
standard analysis ½ dominance fails. To see this observe that if half the population is
playing Hunter/Gather and half is playing Gather/Hunt the best response is Hunt/Hunt,
that is neither of the two. Despite this, we can use Ellison [1995]’s methods to show that12
Hunt/Gather and Gather/Hunt are the unique stochastically stable set in the standard
model. There are many mixed equilibria of this model, but adding one Hunt/Gather
innovation to one of these equilibria causes Hunt/Gather to become the best response and
vice versa, while it takes quite a few innovations to get out of Hunt/Gather or
Gather/Hunt.
5. A Gift Giving Game
We now consider a more extended example. The setting is a gift-giving game
introduced by Johnson, Levine and Pesendorfer [1999] to study the evolution of the
social norm of cooperation. In this game players live two periods in overlapping
generations. Young players are randomly matched against an equal number of old players
and must choose whether to give or withhold a gift from the old opponent. Old players
are passive and do not have an action. However, the behavior when young is reported on
by information systems so they may be reward or punished based on what they did when
they were young. This is a variation on the model of Kandori [1992], and following
Kandori, it is possible to prove a folk theorem for this model if there is “enough”
information about old players.
Specifically, we assume that it costs the young player 1 unit of utility for giving a
gift, and provides a benefit of   B   to the older recipient. Payoffs are additive between
the two periods of life so that gift-giving is efficient.  Note the resemblance of the model
to Prisoners' Dilemma.  The myopic optimum for the young player is to withhold the gift,
just as defection is dominant when the Prisoners’ Dilemma is played once. However, the
overlapping generations environment allows for a connection between actions when
young and payoffs when old, just as repetitions would allow for consequences in later
periods to influence earlier actions in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.
They key assumption is that enables cooperative play is that young players are
(partially) informed about the history of their older opponent. Following Kandori [1992]
we model this through information systems.  An information system provides a signal
about past play. We examine the simplest case in which this signal can take on two
values, which we describe as a “red flag” or a “green flag.”  Let {, } r g  be the set of flags.
Formally, an information system is a map   :  { 0 ,1 } {, } {, } ir g r g  that assigns an old
player a flag based on his own action (the size of the gift – 0 or 1) and the flag of the13
opponent he met when young. It is easily checked that there are 16 information systems.
We denote the set of information systems by I and  i f  for the flag corresponding to
information service i.
Flag vectors  F  corresponding to the different information systems are observed
by young opponents as follows. With probability 1 h -  the flag vector observed is equal
to the vector assigned by the different information systems. With probability  0 h >  the
flag vector observed is chosen randomly according to a uniform distribution on F .  We
assume that the chance a player is assigned a random flag vector is small: specifically
that  :( 1) 1 b ah =- > .
Finally, we assume that a young player may consult only one information system.
This means that the only feasible strategies are those of the form  (,) sa i =  consists of the
choice of one information system iI ¶  and a map  :{ , } {0,1 } ar g   that assigns an
action to a flag.
Finally, we must specify how expected utility   	 UST  is determined. Utility to a
young player depends on expectations of future play by next period young players  T  and
on the distribution of flags among current old players. As usual, we take the previous
period distribution of strategies  ￿ T T ￿  as a proxy for beliefs about expectations of next
period play. We further assume that the distribution of current old player flags is believed
to be the steady state distribution
5,6 of flags corresponding to  ￿ T T ￿  being played
repeatedly. Since all flag vectors have positive probability, this steady state is unique and
we denote the corresponding marginal probability distribution over  &  by  ￿ 	 T GT￿ .
Expected utility is then calculated with respect to  G .
We are going to focus on two key types of strategies. One is the always selfish
strategy of making a low transfer regardless of the old opponent’s flag vector. The second
type of strategy we consider is exemplified by the green-team strategy. This uses an
information system that assigns a green flag to high transfer against a green flag and low
                                                
5 This long run view of the flag distribution may seem inconsistent, but the overlapping generations
structure does not mean that each player only plays once, merely that information about play only persists
for a single period.
6 If beliefs about flag distributions are noisy this will effect results. However, as theorists we are looking
for simple cases to build qualitative intuition – numerical analysis requires simulations. Our focus here is
on role of imitation in propagation so we do not choose to let it compete with other sources of randomness.
The assumption that flag distribution are steady state are only one of many such simplifying assumptions
standard in theoretical evolutionary analysis: we do not allow for noise in computing relative best
responses, in sampling strategies from the population or in payoffs.14
transfer against a red flag, and a red flag to low transfer against green flag and high
transfer against a red flag. The strategy itself is to give high transfer on green flag, low
transfer on red flag. That is a green flag means the player is a member of the team; team
members are supposed to give high transfers to team members and low transfers to non-
team members. Behaving as a team member is the ticket for admission to the team; the
penalty for failing to behave as a team member is expulsion from the team. The other
strategy in this class is red-team which uses the same information system, but uses the
convention of high transfer on red and low transfer on green.
Theorem 5.1: If   C   and  I  sufficiently small the unique stochastically stable state is
always selfish; if   C   the unique stochastically stable state places weight ½ on each
green-team and red-team.
Proof: See Appendix A.
æ
Notice that this is very sharp: for   C   we get always selfish; for   C   we get the
two team strategies as the stochastically stable set. This can be compared to Johnson,
Levine and Pesendorfer [1999] who examine the standard model under slightly different
assumptions and with elaborate calculations are able to get the team strategies emerging
as stochastically stable only for   C  .
6. Characterization of Stochastically Stable States
We first describe 8  in greater detail as a preliminary to defining the modified
resistance, which can be used to give an exact characterization of stochastically stable
state.
Denote by  K 8  the subset of  X 8 for which  	 3K X b . Most of the “action”
takes place in  ￿ 8  in the sense that it is unlikely that there are more than two pure
strategies being used in the population at any moment of time. The space  ￿ 8  has a
relatively simple topological structure, consisting of pure strategies and the segments
connecting them. This has important consequences:
Lemma 6.2: If  ￿ X 8 ,   TT X  ,   	 	 33 TT   with  	  	  	  SS S TT T 
then   TX  .15
Proof: If   TT X   there must be a relative best response path, or equivalently a path of
zero resistance between the two. Such a path cannot pass through  ￿ 8 , so it must pass
through   T . This means that   TX   as well.
æ
We illustrate 8  in the figure below. Here there are 4 points  [] !"#$ SSSS  in
￿ 3 8 . The dashes connecting those pure strategies represent points on the grid  M 4 ;
that is, they are mixtures between exactly two pure strategies. (Note that the drawing is
not exact, since there should be the same number of points   M   between each pair of
pure strategies.) There are three points [] XYZ XXX  in  ￿￿ < 88 . Each one is a set of
points in  ￿
M 4 . The point  Z X  has  	 [] Z" $ 3S S X  , and consists of two points in  ￿
M 4 .
The points   XY XX  each have  	 [] XY ! $ 3S S XX  . The point  X X  consists of two
points in  ￿
M 4 ; the point  Y X  a singleton in  ￿
M 4 .
The case of  X X  and  Z X  are in a sense typical of points in  ￿￿ < 88  in consisting
of two points in  ￿
M 4 . Two see this, let us refer to a mixed strategy equilibrium in a game
using a subset consisting of two pure strategies only as a relative mixed equilibrium.
Recall that any point in  8  consists of points in  ￿
M 4  that are minimal invariant under the
relative best-response dynamic. Consider  [ ] ZZ XT T ;  . Ruling out ties, and
remembering that only one player moves at a time, this means that  : T  is a relative best
response to  Z T  and vice versa. Consequently,  Z X  is a two-cycle. Because only one
player moves at a time, there cannot be cycles of length longer than 2 in  ￿￿ < 88 . Notice
that such a two-cycle arises when   Z: TT are separated by a non-grid point that is a
relative mixed strategy equilibrium stable in the continuous time best response dynamic.
Of course if such a relative mixed equilibrium was actually on a grid point, then that
point would as a singleton set be in  ￿￿ < 88  such as  X . However, it is unlikely that a
relative mixed equilibrium will actually lie on a grid point. If a relative mixed
equilibrium is unstable in the continuous time best response dynamic, then there will be
no corresponding point in  ￿ 8 .
Suppose that  ￿  XX8 % . We say that they are adjacent if it possible to go from
one to the other without passing through another point in  ￿ 8 . More precisely,
￿  XX8 % are adjacent if there is a path  ￿ ￿  	 M
+ TT 4 K  from  X  to  X %  such that for
all  ￿ X 8 )  and   K+  ,  K TX  ) . For example, in the figure,   XX  are adjacent
because  ￿ ￿  TT K  is a path between them that does not pass through any  X 8 .16
Notice that every point in  < 88  is adjacent to exactly two other points in  8 , while














For any two points  ￿  XX8 % , there is a unique sequence  ￿ ￿  + XX 8 K  such
that  ￿ XX  ,  + XX  %  and  ￿  KK XX ￿  are adjacent. For each K  define
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ 	   	   	
K+
JJ JJ JJ K RK R R X X XX XX
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿   %
and define  	 M I N 	 K RR K XX XX  %% . Note that   	  	 RR XX XX  %% . The modified
resistance is  e	 	 	 RR R XX XX XX  %%%
Theorem 6.2: With unlikely innovation  	  NX   if and only if  X  is the root of a tree
with least modified resistance in  ￿ 8 .
Proof: In Appendix B.
æ
7. The Continuous Approximation
In many applications it is useful to think of M  as being large, as round-off error
on the grid is not usually of much economic interest. This leads us to define cost as the
limit of per capita modified resistance. Most results about modified resistance then have
an analog in terms of cost.
Suppose that   SS 3  % . As we did earlier, for   X bb define a family of
mixed strategies  	 X T  by  	 ;= 	 ;=  XS X XS X TT   % . Consider the utility difference17









C S S 5 XD X 5 XD X 5 XD X w    ¨¨ ¨ % .
 For any pure profile S  let  	 4S  be all trees on 3  with root S .
￿￿ e	 M I N  	 	 4S S CS CS S U U ￿  % %% .
We first establish the relationship between modified resistance and cost.
Theorem 7.1:  L I M  	   	 M RSS M CSS ld  %% .
Proof:  Follows from integration theory and the definitions.
æ
The most useful application of Theorem 7.1 is through an obvious corollary.
Corollary 7.2: If  	 	 CC UU  %  then for all M  sufficiently large,  ee 	 	 RR UU  % .
This corollary means that for M  large the least modified resistance trees are a subset of
the least cost trees. In particular, least cost is a necessary (although no longer sufficient)
condition to be stochastically stable. From Theorem 6.1, we have
Corollary 7.3: Suppose unlikely innovation and sufficiently largeM . Then  [ ]	  S N 
only if
ee 	 M I N 	 S3 CS CS ￿  % % .
Finally, because zero cost connection play an important role in the theory, it is important
that zero cost implies zero modified resistance for all sufficiently large M .
Theorem 7.4: If   	  CSS  %  then for all M  sufficiently large   	  RSS  % .
Proof: To be shown.
æ
8. Further Results
We now give a more detailed characterization of stochastically stable sets.
Definition 8.1:   S  is a strongly better response to S  if    	  CSS 18
If a profile admits no strongly better response, we call it a generalized strict Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 8.2: S  is a generalized strict Nash equilibrium if    	  CSS   for all
 SS v .
Since a strategy that does strictly worse cannot be a strongly better response, every strict
Nash equilibrium is a generalized strict Nash equilibrium.
Definition 8.3: 4  is a strongly better response cycle if
1) S 4 and   S  a strongly better  response to S  implies   S 4
2)   SS 4 implies a sequence  ￿ ￿   	 + SS S K  such that  ￿  + SS S S   and  ￿ K S ￿  is a
strongly better  response to  K S
Theorem 8.1: If S  is the unique long-run stationary state then S  is a generalized strict
Nash equilibrium
Proof: If not and S  is the root of a least cost tree, find    	  CSS   and paste it above the
root.
æ
Remark: The sum of costs in both directions is less than or equal one.
Theorem 8.2: In a least cost tree   	 	    CS S U b
Proof: If not cut S . Pasting either above or below the root costs less than or equal ½.
æ
Denote the set of pairs with costs strictly between zero and one
[  	 \    	 ] 0S S C S S   .
Assumption 8.1 [Generic Assumption]: If  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  00 00 0 v  then
￿￿
	 	
P0 P0 CP CP
￿￿ v 
Theorem 8.3: Under the assumption 8.1  if  
[ \  	 ] SS N 8   is not a singleton, it is
a strongly better response cycle.19
Proof: If S  is the root of a least cost tree, then so are all strongly better responses, since
we may cut them and paste above the root without increasing the cost. Suppose that   S  is
the root of a least cost tree and that there is no zero-cost path from   S  to S . Let   S  be
the first predecessor of   S  in the lowest cost S -tree that is connected with a non-zero
cost. Then there is a least cost tree with root   S . But this tree does not have the cost
   		 S CS S U , so the tree has a different cost then the S -tree by the generic assumption.
æ
Remark: It should be possible without the generic assumption to show that we get at most
a collection of generalized Nash equilibria and strongly better response cycles.
Remark: An implication of Theorem 8.3 is that under the generic Assumption 8.1 either
there is a generalized strict Nash equilibrium or a strongly better response cycle. We can
show directly that this is true in every game. For any point S  define the successor set
	 3S
r
to be the set of points reachable by a sequence of zero cost moves. Suppose there is
no generalized strict Nash equilibrium. Then every strategy has a strongly better
response. So there exists a point  	 S3 S 
r
. We say that  	 3S
r
 is minimal if there does not
exist a point    	 S3 S 
r
 with   	 	 3S 3S 
rr
. Since 3   is finite there exists a minimal set.
We claim that such a minimal set is a strongly better response cycle. Already  	 3S
r
 is
closed under the strongly better response operation since by construction it contains all
successor points. Let   	 S3 S 
r
. We must show   	 S3 S 
r
. Suppose not. It may not be
the case that    	 S3 S 
r
, but because there is no strong better response cycle, there is a
point    	 S3 S 
r
 with    	 S3 S 
r
. Since    	 S3 S 
r
 it must be that   	  	 3S 3S 
rr
and by hypothesis   	 S3 S 
r
 so   	 S3 S 
r
. But   	     	 S3 S S 3 S 
rr
 so    	 S3 S 
r
implying   	  	 3S 3S 
rr




We now characterize generic pairwise matching games in which   3  . We
make the generic Assumption 8.1, and the additional assumption
Assumption 8.2: For all   SS v ,   	    CSS v . If    	  CSS   then   	  CS S  .
Case 1: There is no generalized strict Nash equilibrium. Then there is a unique strongly
better response cycle consisting of all three strategies, which is the stochastically stable
set.20
Case 2: There is one generalized strict Nash equilibrium. There is no strongly better
response cycle, so generalized strict Nash equilibrium is the stochastically stable set.
Case 3: There are two generalized strict Nash equilibria. Attach the third strategy with
zero cost to one of the two equilibria, then we need only worry about how to attach the
equilibria; the equilibrium with least cost of getting to the other is the unique point in the
stochastically stable set.
Case 4: There are three generalized strict Nash equilibria.
Case 4a: One generalized strict Nash equilibrium beats the field. It is the unique point in
the stochastically stable set.
Case 4b: Two generalized strict Nash equilibria beat the field. This reduces to a contest
between the two; the one with the least cost of getting to the other is the unique point in
the stochastically stable set.
Case 4c: No generalized strict Nash equilibrium beats the field. Consequently each has a
unique successor with cost less than ½. This means the only possible least cost trees are
linear. The least cost linear tree has at the top the strategy with the greatest cost less than
½ , and this is the unique point in the stochastically stable set.
Notice that the only case where the stochastically stable set is not a singleton is case 1.21
Appendix A: Gift-Giving Game
Theorem 5.1: If   C  and  I  sufficiently small the unique stochastically stable state is
always selfish; if   C   the unique stochastically stable state places weight ½ on each
green-team and red-team.
Proof: If half the population is playing always selfish, high transfer when young can
yield an expected gain when old of at most   C , while costing 1 today. So if   C  ,
always selfish wins all pairwise contests and is the unique stochastically stable state. This
is despite the fact that high transfer by all players Pareto dominates low transfer by all
players.
Clearly if green-team is stochastically stable, so is red-team and vice versa. We
will show that when   C   the two strategies together beat the field, so, according to
Theorem 4.2, they constitute the unique stochastically stable set. Because of symmetry, it
suffices to consider just green-team.
Assume   C  . Notice first, that green-team beats always selfish. To see this,
suppose that half or more of the population is playing green-team, and the rest always
selfish. If the old opponent has a red flag, both strategies give a low transfer, and the
same expected utility. However, since there is flag noise, the steady state flag distribution
has some green flags, and in this case green-team and always selfish behave differently.
Always selfish today gives a benefit of 1 today, but green-team yields a benefit of at least
 C  tomorrow. This follows because with probability  I   there is no flag noise, and
green-team will receive a high transfer from green team members, while always selfish
will not receive any transfer. If there is flag noise, the two strategies get the same
expected utility tomorrow. So under the assumption that   C   the payoff to green-team
is strictly higher than that of always selfish. By a similar argument, green-team beats
never selfish, the strategy of high transfer regardless of flag vectors.
Consequently, we can restrict attention to opposing strategies that depend on the
flag from some information system. Without loss of generality, since the actual names of
the flags do not matter, we may examine the strategies that give high transfer on green
flag, low transfer on red flag.
There are four flag combinations of the form (green-team-flag, non-green-team-
flag). Let   G b be fraction of population playing non-green-team. In all cases we can22
ignore the second period payoffs following a randomly assigned flag. We have the
following cases
(g,g): green-team and non-green-team play the same way, so give the same payoff.
(r,r):   green-team and non-green-team play the same way, so give the same payoff.
(r,g): green-team gets at least   	 GC  ; non-green-team gets either  GC  or 0
depending on whether it rewards itself for high transfer. Since   G b , the advantage
to green-team is at least 1.
(g,r) if non-green-team is to beat green-team it has to win this one, since it ties or loses all
other  combinations, and combinations have positive probability.
Focusing on the (g,r) combination, green-team gets at least  	 GC  . Non-green-
team gets either  GC   or 1 depending on whether it rewards itself for high transfer. If
it gets zero, it loses since   C  . So it must assign low transfer on red a green flag.
Moreover, it cannot assign high transfer on red a green flag, since then it gives green-
team an additional  GC , and again loses to green-team. So we may assume that non-
green-team on a red flag gives green for selfish, red for altruistic.
Suppose in fact non-green-team on a red flag gives green for low transfer, red for
high transfer. So green-team is winning at (r,g) and non-green-team at (g,r). Moreover,
non-green-team cannot reliably reward at (r,g) (that is, give green to high transfer on
green and red to low transfer on green) since then it actually is the green-team strategy.
So at (r,g) green-team actually has an advantage of   	 GC  . To summarize the
advantage to green-team is:
(r,g)   	 GC 
(g,r)  	  GC G C  
Now we need the steady state probabilities.  Let  R  be steady state probability of
(g,r). Then  G  of the population is non-green team, and a fraction  GR  of them meet (g,r),
so they give a low transfer and have probability  	 I   of winding up in (r,g). So the
steady state probability of (r,g) is at least   	   GR I I  . Consequently, the expected
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      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 23
Since  	
  	    	   	 GI I R G G    is strictly positive for     G bb , this
is strictly increasing in  C . So it suffices to show that this expression is non-negative
for  C  . Substituting   C   yields
	
 	
   	 	     	   	 RG I G G I G    
This is quadratic in G  with second derivative    	  RI   , so it suffices to show the
expression non-negative for   G  . At   G   we have     RI  . At
 G   we have   	 IR  , so it suffices that at the steady state   R b .
It is easy to compute the steady state distribution when   I  . Conjecture that
 R  . The only way to get to (r,g) is for a non-green-team to meet (g,r),
 	    PR R G  . The only way to get to (r,r) is for a non-green-team to meet (r,g), so
	    PR R R  . The only way to get to (g,g) is for anyone to meet (r,r) so
	    P RGG  . Since that adds up to 1, we are done. Now it is pretty clear that adding
noise cannot make  R  bigger than ½. We will do the local computation for  I  small: Let
	 X I  be the steady state probabilities if they are unique. Let E  be the vector
corresponding to a uniform distribution. Then Taylor’s theorem tell us that to first order
	   	  	  XX E II I   ; so that
 







Appendix B: Main Theorem
Theorem 6.2: With unlikely innovation  	  NX   if and only if  X  is the root of a tree
with least modified resistance in  ￿ 8 .
The proof requires several steps. In Lemma B.3, we show that we can characterize
[ ]	  S N   by looking at least resistance trees on  ￿ 8 . We then show in Lemma B.4 that
there exist least resistance trees in  ￿ 8  with  	 UX  is adjacent to  X . This enables us to
characterize  [ ]	  S N   by looking only at trees on  8 . First we establish a useful
technical result.
Lemma B.1: Suppose that  	  NX  , and that  U  is a least resistance  X -tree. Suppose
XX v % . If 	  3 X  %  then  	 	   RN M XUX b %% .  If 	  3 X  %  then
	 	 RM XUX b %% .
Proof: By Theorem 3.3  X  is a singleton pure strategy. Let  U  be a least resistance  X -
tree.
First, suppose that 	  3 X  % . Then if we cut  X %  and paste it to the root  X  we
save  	 	 R XUX %%  in the cut. Moreover, either  	   RN M XX b %  or
	   RN M XX b % .  In the former case paste  X %  to the root, in the latter paste the root
to it. So the new tree has resistance increased by at most      		 NM R XUX  %% . From
Young’s Theorem, this is non-negative, giving the first result.
Now suppose that  	  3 X  % . Suppose in particular that  	 [ ] 3S S X  ) % % .
Observe that either  	   RS M X b % %  or  	   RS M X b ) % . Without loss of generality
suppose the former. As in the previous case, we may cut S % and paste either above or
below the root. The new tree has resistance increased by at most   M . Now, cut  X %  and
paste it to S %. The cutting saves  	 	 R XUX %% , while the paste adds at most   M  by the
way we chose S %. So we have increased resistance by at most
  	 	   	 	 MR M R M XUX XUX   %% %% . From Young’s Theorem, this is non-
negative, giving the second result.
æ
In Appendix C we prove25
Lemma C.1 [Tree Trimming]: Let  ￿ 8 8  8 % . Suppose that for every least
resistance tree in  8 % , there is another least resistance tree  U  with the same root and
￿￿ 	 UX 8 whenever  ￿￿ X 8 .  Then least resistance trees in  8 %  have roots in  ￿ 8 ,
and  X  is the root of a least resistance tree in 8 %  if and only if it is the root of a least
resistance tree in  ￿ 8 .
Lemma B.2: With unlikely innovation 	  NX   if and only if
￿ ￿￿ 	 M I N 	 RR X XX ￿8  % %
Proof: If 	  3 X  , by Lemma B.1,  	 	   RN M XUX b . On the other hand, if
 	 	  3 UX  , then  	 	  RN XUX p . With unlikely innovation, this is a contradiction.
If  	  3 X  , by Lemma B.1,  	 	 RM XUX b . On the other hand, if
 	 	  3 UX  , then  	 	 RN XUX p . With unlikely innovation, this is again a
contradiction.
We conclude that if  ￿ X 8  then  ￿ 	 UX 8 . The result then follows directly
from Lemma C.1.
æ
Lemma B.3: With unlikely innovation if  	  NX   there is a least resistance  X -tree  U
in  ￿ 8  such that  X %  and  	 UX %  are adjacent for all  XX v %
Proof: Let  U  be a least resistance  X -tree. Suppose that  X %  and  	 UX %  are not adjacent.
Then every for every path from  X %  and  	 UX %  there must be some  X )  and  TX  )  that
lies on that path. In particular, this must be true for any least resistance path from  X %  to
	 UX % . In this case, it is obvious from the definition of resistance that
(*) 	 	 	 	 	 RR R XX XUX XUX b )) %% % % .
If  X %  is in the subtree with root  X )  cut it and paste it to  X ) . Cutting reduces the
resistance by  	 	 R XUX %% , while pasting adds  	 R XX ) % . By (*) the resistance of the tree is
not increased.
Suppose that  X %  is not in the subtree with root  X ) . First we cut  X )  and paste it to
	 UX % . Then we cut  X %  and past it to  X ) . In effect, we place  X )  in between  X %  and  	 UX % .
Cutting  X )  does not increase the resistance. Pasting to  	 UX %  increases the resistance by
	 	 R XUX ) % . Cutting  X %  reduces the resistance by  	 	 R XUX %% . Pasting it to  X )  increases26
the resistance by  	 R XX ) % . So the resistance is increased by
	 	 	 	 	 RRR XUX XUX XX  )) %% %% . By (*) the resistance of the tree has not been
increased.
Now repeat the process, noting that once  	 XUX %%  are adjacent, the procedure
never breaks this link, so the process does not cycle. At the end we have a least resistance
X -tree with the required property.
æ
Proof of Theorem 6.2: Given any  ￿ 8 tree  U  with root in  ￿ 8 , we may define a tree
￿	 U 8  in  ￿ 8  by defining  ￿	 	 UX 8  to be the closest predecessor of  X  in  ￿ 8 . If  U  has
a root in  ￿ 8  and if  X %  and  	 UX %  are adjacent for all  XX v %  we say that  U  is an
adjacent- 8  tree. By Lemma B.4 and Young’s Theorem  	  NX   if and only if  X  is
the root of a least-resistance adjacent- 8  tree. We will show that within the adjacent-8
trees there is a class of proto- ￿ 8  trees for which
￿ e 	  	 	 	  
SS RR R S S UU
v 8   % % ,
and that there exist least resistance  X  proto- ￿ 8  trees. Since   	   SS RSS v 4 % %  is a constant
that does not depend on  U , and since  ￿	 8¸ preserves the root and maps the space of
proto- ￿ 8  trees onto the space of  ￿ 8  trees, this implies the desired result.
Consider a node  ￿ < X 8 8  in an adjacent- 8  tree  U .  We refer to this as a
binary point. Observe that a binary point can be adjacent to only two points.  Since a
binary point is not the root, is has an immediate predecessor that is adjacent to it, and it
follows that it can have only one immediate successor. If  X  has a successor in  ￿ 8  we
call it a trapped node if not we call it a dangling node.
For two points  ￿  SS8 % , let  ￿ ￿  + XX 8 K  be the unique sequence such that
￿ XX  ,  + XX  %  and  ￿  KK XX ￿  are adjacent. Observe the all of these nodes are
trapped, or all are dangling. Note that the resistance is
￿
￿ ￿  	   	
+
KK K RSS RXX
￿
￿ ￿   % .
If  	 	 SS U 8 %, because  U  is adjacent- 8 , in  U the nodes  K X  must be trapped in
between   SS % in the correct order. This implies that the resistance of  U  is the resistance
of  ￿ U  plus the resistance of the dangling nodes.27
If neither  ￿	 	 SS U 8 % nor  ￿	 	 SS U 8 %  we say that   SS % is a dangling pair. In
this case, for some K   K X  is a successor of S  and  ￿ K X ￿  is a successor of S %. In the least
resistance tree, we clearly must choose K  to minimize
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ 	   	   	
K +
JJ JJ JJ K RK R R X X XX XX
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   % .
Any tree which minimizes this expression for all dangling pairs is called a proto- ￿ 8  tree.
Notice that for any  ￿￿ U 8  there is a proto- ￿ 8  tree  U  with  ￿￿ 	 UU 8 , so the map
￿	 8¸ is onto as asserted.
To compute the resistance of the dangling nodes in a proto- ￿ 8  tree, we sum
 	 RSS % over all dangling pairs   SS %.  Alternatively, instead of adding  ￿￿  	 	 R U 8 to  R  for
all dangling pairs, we may add it to  R  for all pairs, and subtract   	 RSS %  for those pairs
that are not dangling. In other words,
￿￿  	   		   	    		
SS S RR R S S R S S UU U
v 8    % %  .
Substituting the definition of the modifed resistance, this is the desired result.
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Appendix C: Tree Trimming
Lemma C.1 [Tree Trimming]: Let  ￿ 8 8  8 % . Suppose that for every least
resistance tree in  8 % , there is another least resistance tree  U  with the same root and
￿￿ 	 UX 8 whenever  ￿￿ X 8 .  Then least resistance trees in  8 %  have roots in  ￿ 8 ,
and  X  is the root of a least resistance tree in 8 %  if and only if it is the root of a least
resistance tree in  ￿ 8 .
Remark: Notice that this can be applied recursively. That is, after we have applied the
lemma once to looking only at trees in  ￿ 8 , we can then apply the lemma to a subset
￿￿ ￿ 8 8 .
Proof: We refer to a tree for which  ￿￿ X 8  implies  ￿￿ 	 UX 8  as a proto- ￿ 8
tree. It is apparent the proto- ￿ 8  trees must have roots in  ￿ 8 , so by the hypothesis, least
resistance trees in 8 %  must have roots in  ￿ 8 .
Next, we map proto- ￿ 8  trees to  ￿ 8  trees, and show how to compute the
resistance of the proto- ￿ 8  trees from that of the corresponding  ￿ 8  tree. This will enable
us to show that it is sufficient to minimize resistance over  ￿ 8 . Specifically, a proto- ￿ 8

























￿￿ 	  	 	 	 RR R UU U ￿ 8  %% % .
Finally, consider a tree  ￿ U  in  ￿ 8  and a proto- ￿ 8  tree  U %. We may construct










£ 8 ¦ ¦ ¦  ¤ ¦ 8 8 ¦ ¦ ¥
%
% %
This tree has resistance  ￿￿ 	  	 RR UU ￿  % .
Now suppose that  U  is a least resistance tree. Let  U % be the corresponding least
resistance proto- ￿ 8  tree. Suppose that  ￿￿ ￿￿ 	  	 	 RR UU 8 % .  Then29
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ e  	  	 	  	 	 	 	 	 RR R RR R R UU U U U U U U ￿￿   8    %% %
contradicting the assumption that  U  has least resistance. This proves the “only if” part of
the Lemma.
 Suppose conversely, that  ￿ U  has least resistance among all  ￿ 8  trees. Let  U % be a
minimizer of  	 R U ￿ % . Then clearly  ￿ UU  %  is least resistance in 8 % .
æ
Corollary C.2: Suppose that  ￿ 8 8  8 % , and that for all  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   < XX X X 8 8 8 % % %% .
(i)  If  ￿￿  	  	 RR XX X X  % %%  then roots of least resistance 8 %  trees are in  ￿ 8 .
(ii)  If in addition  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  	 M I N [  	   	 ] RR R XX XX X X p %  then  X  is the root of a
least resistance tree in  8 %  if and only if it is the root of a least resistance tree in
￿ 8 .
Proof:  First, we establish that least resistance trees in 8 %  must have roots in  ￿ 8 . If not,
then there is some  ￿ < X 8 8 % % %  that is the root of a least resistance tree  U . Moreover,
there must be some  ￿￿ X 8  with  ￿￿ 	 < UX X  8 8 % % . Cutting  ￿ X  saves  ￿  	 R XX % .
Pasting the root to  ￿ X  costs  ￿  	 R XX % % . So by assumption the resistance of the tree has
been strictly reduced, contradicting the assumed minimality of  U .
Now suppose that  ￿￿ ￿ X 8  is the root of a least resistance tree  U . If
￿￿ 	 < UX X  8 8 % % , then cutting  ￿ X  saves  ￿  	 R XX % . If  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  	  	 RR XX X X p %  then
pasting the root  ￿ X  does not increase the resistance; while if  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  	  	 RR XX XX p %  then
pasting  ￿ X  to the root does not increase the resistance. By assumption, one of these must
be the case. Proceeding iteratively, we see that there exists a least resistance tree e U in
which  ￿￿ X 8  implies  ￿￿ e	 UX 8 .  The result now follows from Lemma C.1.
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